“Finally understand what Jaspers’ philosophizing is all about,” this is the motivation guiding Anton Hügli’s new book (ix). It is no typical introduction, which presents an author’s life and work chronologically or based on specific topics but an attempt to capture the fundamental intentions of Jaspers’ thought as well as the specific “thought processes” (xx) through which philosophical questions are addressed. The book summarizes Hügli’s almost life-long dedication to Jaspers’ work, which the author believes is “especially necessary in view of today’s global, but increasingly uncommunicative communication” (xi).
Communication, for Hügli, is no afterthought, in the sense that philosophical thought would first be worked out in silence and only in a second step communicated to others. Philosophy is “designed for communication” (x). However, communication must not be understood in a narrow sense, say, as exchange of information. It rather carries an existential meaning: “Communication begins when we feel addressed and try to meet that demand” (xx). Chapter 1, therefore, starts with one of the most fundamental philosophical concepts, truth.
There is “no truth without communication, without sharing what I believe to be true” (8; cf. also 194). In seeking a sharable or even universally valid truth, the individual adopts a form of “consciousness that is identical for all” (2). With it comes a separation from the object of inquiry, or, as Hügli has it, the “subject-object-split.” This split cannot be bridged: “We can never say what the total being is” (ibid.), because as soon as we try to do so, we place ourselves outside of it. The split eventually motivates the idea of the “encompassing” as that “which simultaneously embraces both sides of [the] division, the world and the thinking ego” (3). But the encompassing too can only be thought, not said, which means that there is no definitive way in which humans can capture their own being as being rooted in being as a whole. Any theory about human nature that fails to consider this unsurpassable limitation is reductive, whether it is naturalistic or based on cultural and historical conditions (cf. 4).
The same holds for all metaphysical conceptions of the encompassing. In Chapter 2, Hügli lays out the “fundamental error of […] monist theories” (18), realist and idealist versions alike. The encompassing is only given in different “modes,” which include the different modes in which human beings can be conceived, as “Dasein, consciousness in general, and spirit” (ibid.). Chapter 3 introduces further concepts, such as “borderline situations” and “existence,” whereby the latter stands for a radically individual mode of being. In this mode, the question how a human being should exist presents itself with “unconditionality”; a dimension which “Jaspers himself experienced […] in his will to unlimited communication and in his love for his wife” (30). Unconditionality, by whatever it is represented, cannot be deduced from any independent instance; it is given only because the existing individual embraces it (cf. 32). Chapter 4 continues the account of existence with the phenomenon of loneliness. Loneliness and communication belong together: “We are separated because each one has to find the truth that is truth for him, and we are united because each one needs the other for this.” (39)
Chapters 5 and 6 are crucial for the understanding of the fundamental methodical premises of Jaspers’ approach. Hügli states, almost in passing: “Jaspers considered himself a professor of philosophy. He modestly refrained from presenting himself as a great philosopher and repeatedly warned against such confusion” (114). One could also say: Jaspers did not intend to present an original or new approach to philosophical thought. His thinking mostly stayed within the framework articulated by Kant. Chapter 1 already mentioned the subject-object-split, which, according to the author, only “Kant […] brought […] to compete clarity” (3, cf. also 51). This statement seems to overstate Kant’s historical significance, however, there is no doubt that Kant is the central point of reference for Jaspers’ philosophical thought.
There is much that “Jaspers owes to Kant” (58). Methodically speaking, “reason […] became, along with existence, the second key concept in Jaspers’ philosophizing” (ibid). Reason affords the possibility to think beyond the limits of the empirical world and adopt a transcendent point of view, however, it does so without making it necessary to engage in unjustifiable and dogmatic forms of metaphysical speculation. Jaspers relies on Kant’s “ideas of reason” as a critically restrained way of articulating the “modes of the encompassing” (ibid.; cf. also 21, footnote 4). At the same time, Jaspers follows the Neo-Kantian tendency of using Kant’s practical philosophy as the foundation for the understanding of all reason: “For Jaspers, as for Kant, the idea of freedom is the fulcrum around which their entire philosophizing revolves and the only place in which transcendence can become tangible for us” (58).
The practical, i.e., spontaneous character of reason is laid out in Chapter 6. Reason, for Jaspers, is “the will to unity” (61), however, the idea of unity is not conceivable or given independent of this will. Rather, “the circularity of transcending thought becomes apparent: the will to reason that arises from existence makes reason possible in the first place, but it is only through reason that what this will wants can become clear” (68). Hügli rightfully states that the emphasis on reason is of particular significance in the historical context of National Socialism (cf. 58). “If neither belief in harmony nor indignation can have the last word, what are we left with?” (82).
Chapter 7 uses the Kantian distinction between understanding (Verstand) and reason to separate direct from indirect communication. The former contains “thoughts that have no connection to ourselves and that anyone can think in the same way,” whereas in the latter, “it makes a significant difference in my life how I relate to the thought” (90). Hügli uses the distinction to introduce Jaspers’ conception of ciphers. He refers to them with the German word “Chiffer,” however, the use of the foreign term does not seem to add clarity to the notion. (Most key terms are also capitalized in the text, which may have been done to signal their terminological meaning. Unfortunately, the repetition of many capitalized terms in the English text – “Reason,” “Existence,” etc. – makes these notions seem less like technical terms than like slogans.)
From a systematic point of view, Hügli emphasizes that ciphers possess a critically restrained status, too. They are “meaningless without the possible existence of the reader, who, addressed by them, transforms himself inwardly” (98). There is again an obvious but not vicious circle: while the ciphers allow for the will to strive towards transcendence, they are only transcendent because the individual is open to going beyond the limiting conditions of its physical existence (cf. 35). Any “dogmatic hardening” (34) must be avoided.
Chapter 8 traces some of Jaspers’ attempts towards a world philosophy, as a dialogue with the great thinkers of all cultures, which is again significant during the time of National Socialism (105). Hügli also shows how important Plotinus was for Jaspers, given that “Kant’s critical philosophy is a transcendental philosophy, but not a philosophy of transcendence” (115). Neoplatonism also inspired the idea of love as a “tractic force” (116). The theme of love is intriguing, for example, when Hügli writes that “what sustains existential communication is love” (40). The theme also appears in other passages of the book. However, no clear overall account of the phenomenon of love emerges.
Eventually, the sporadic treatment of love is indicative of a certain limitation of Hügli’s approach. Insofar as he focuses more on the method and style of Jaspers’ work, specific topics are often not introduced with as much detail as they would need. At the same time, the book covers many themes that are mentioned in Jaspers’ thought, and by covering almost too much, it occasionally seems that it ends up covering too little. For example, with respect to love, the author emphasizes that it is “not love in the sense of caritas, which is ultimately based on a power relationship in which one gives and the other takes. Nor [is it meant] in the sense of erotic love, which forges two people together to the exclusion of all others, but love in the sense of Socratic eros, which is directed to everyone and which is not directed to what people actually are, but to the best in them that they can be” (40). While none of these statements is per se implausible, they are all touching far too quickly on topics that possess not only existential depth but have also been treated extensively in human thought, so that eventually each point the author makes could be contested and interpreted differently.
In Chapter 9, Hügli explains Jaspers’ use of negative dialectic, which in Chapter 10 leads to a discussion of philosophical faith, which in turn is addressed in the context of revelation, nihilism, and agnosticism, to name but a few of the concepts that are involved. Chapter 11 closes with Jaspers’ political ideas, which also follow Kant in imagining a universal world order and peace (164). Hügli shows that the value of democracy, for Jaspers, is rooted in the idea of reason (176) and that a commitment to truth is needed for political leaders, too (180).
Overall, the author paints a densely woven, convincing picture of the moral commitment that guides Jaspers’ thinking. In the final summary, he states that reason, “breaking through authoritative proclamations of religion,” involves people “in communication with each other, questioning each other, struggling with each other, and often fighting against each other. […] The only criterion by which philosophical ideas can be judged is whether they help or hinder communication. […] The imperative of reason is to break through all mental barriers” (199). The consistency with which this commitment is articulated is impressive. One could only argue that the book says little about the actual process of communication.
Undoubtedly, no one may disagree that communication is lacking in the current world (cf. 193) and that morally speaking, a commitment to worldwide communication is needed if one ever wishes to achieve global freedom and peace (cf. 201). But how do we deal with actual disagreement or with barriers to communication as they may arise not only between cultures but within one culture alone? One could say that Jaspers’ existential philosophy, despite claiming that it is intended in a truly intersubjective way, can eventually not reach the level of genuine plurality. Existence is by definition individual. Jaspers may also face the same limitations that so often have been diagnosed in Kant’s philosophy, especially in its moral part. An unconditionally determined will is after all just that, a will. It can only hope to be reciprocated in others but does not entail a conception of the institutions and practices that would give communication a basis in human reality.
This is no criticism of the book. In a sense, it is its strength because it highlights both the enduring significance and the limitations of Jaspers’ Kantian existentialism. As Hügli shows with great expertise, this existentialism is most convincing in making us aware that truth is no neutral achievement and not limited to the impersonal dimension of facts. Truth requires the individual’s commitment to be sustained as well as the openness to be shared with others so that everyone becomes enriched in this exchange.

(22 dicembre 2025)