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Loi et nécessité. Sur la distinction leibnizienne des vérités de fait et des vérités de raison chez Husserl

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Husserl recognized the importance of the Leibnizian distinction between factual truths and rational truths many times, which he expected would allow for clarification of the relationship between facts and laws, the real and the ideal, the contingent and the necessary. He also thought that this distinction had been important in his own philosophical journey, and in what could be called his conversion to philosophy. But what meaning did he give to this distinction? When considering necessity, did he understand it as that of which the opposite is the impossible, as that which can be brought back to the identicals through a finite analysis, or as that which is true in all possible worlds? These are the three possible pathways into Leibniz's analyses of modalities. This paper begins with the idea that rational truths, such as Husserl understood them, are truths founded exclusively on concepts, whereas factual truths are all the other sorts of truths, which – implicitly or explicitly – presume existence. It then goes on to demonstrate how Sigwart's Logic had a crucial impact on Husserl's interpretation of this Leibnizian distinction: not only negatively (as a contrast or point of departure), but also positively as a true inspiration, because Leibniz's distinction is here interpreted beginning with Sigwart's distinction between an 'empirical generality' and an 'unconditional generality', elaborated in his theory of plural judgement.