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*Le implicazioni metafisiche del positivismo: un contributo husserliano*

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The paper investigates the relationship between positivism and metaphysics through the reference to Husserl's arguments against psychologism in his essay *Prolegomena to pure logic*. First, I specify the forms of psychologism which Husserl's critique is directed. Second, I show that most arguments presuppose a requirement which, at first blush, seems not justified: the ideal character of logic. Third, I point out that Husserl, more or less explicitly, has justified the ideal character of logic in a peculiar argument – the antiskeptical argument – which assumes a key role in the structure of *Prolegomena*. It shows that the rejection of idealism runs up against a specific countersense (*Widersinn*) which I will try to clarify because it seems to me an important point of view to disclose the hidden metaphysical assumptions of positivistic rejection of metaphysics.