This paper aims to discuss what is the proper phenomenological approach to pain experience, and in particular to examine whether pain can be better investigated from a classical Husserlian perspective or rather a different point of view. The issue concerning the sensible character of pain is examined through a preliminary discussion of Wittgenstein's well-known theses concerning the im-possibility of a private knowledge and the question concerning the expression of emotions. In the light of the problems emerging from Wittgenstein's approach, the paper discusses Husserl's contribution against the background of the Brentano-Stumpf debate, and then moves towards an evaluation of Husserl's later developments concerning the phenomenological status of the body. In this connection, a different possible conception of the feeling/felt body is suggested, inspired by Merleau-Ponty's position, which can better account for the peculiar logic of affectivity displayed by the experience of pain. The paper claims that only the notion of a sensible body, and not of consciousness in general, can pro-vide the adequate ontological framework for the proper understanding of pain.