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The Golden Mountain
Remarks on the Principle of Conceivability in the Early-Modern Age (Clauberg, Tschirnhaus, Hume)

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In this paper I shall discuss conceivability as a logical and gnoseological principle, focusing on early-modern ontology, rationalism and empiricism. Specifically, I intend to show that early-modern ontology (Clauberg) develops as a hyper-ontology at the expense of the principle of conceivability, which rationalist ontology (Tschirnhaus) employs to guarantee the centrality of the subject and the logical-real possibility of its objects. Subsequently, empiricism (Hume) turns the principle of conceivability into a metaphysical criterion with an exclusively logical import, i.e. views it as separate and distinct from the domain of real things. In this context, the *golden mountain* is the fictitious object representing the principle of conceivability.