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*Il falso e la predicazione impossibile nel De Principiis di Damascio*

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The purpose of this paper is to show how the conception of *truly false* as declined in Damascius' *De Principiis* (I, 15.6-16.4), although inspired by the theories of Plato and Aristotle, goes beyond both of them, since it involves every single statement that can be made concerning the Absolute First Principle of reality, which is beyond being and thinking. In its valence of desemantization of language, as no word or discourse can adequately conform itself to the transcendent status of the principle, the *truly false* reveals the impossibility of any kind of predication about the principle, opens the possibility for a non-logical space of discourse that can only be false and, at the same time, points out the impotence of reason and language in front of the principle.