In the following article, I shall compare the philosophies of Descartes and Husserl considering the problem of consciousness. Analyzing the Husserlian criticism of Descartes, I aim to indicate how Husserl, as opposed to Descartes, proposes the enlargement and desubstantialization of Cartesian consciousness, so as to think the human mind as an inclusive flow of unconscious thoughts. Next, I will reread Descartes’ texts in the light of Husserlian criticism, showing how they can reveal a paradoxical affinity with Husserlian philosophy. In particular, I will show that in some Cartesian texts it is possible to identify a model of non-substantial subjectivity which, as embodied, is endowed with not mere self-conscious cogitations. In doing so, I hope to clarify some issues related to the debate (seemingly endless and undecidable) on the relations between Descartes and phenomenology, deepening the Cartesian legacy of the phenomenological movement of the twentieth century and, for this very reason, its historical-genetic statute.