The aim of this work is to approach pain from phenomenology as an experience that, in spite of being lived in the first person, it can also be experienced indirectly and be enriched with the third-person experience characteristic of science. I will approach it as a way of feeling one’s own body and – through it – the world and others. I will discuss the presumed non-intentionality of pain by analyzing other modes of intentionality that integrate total intentionality in which passivity acts. This passivity will help us understand the “senses” of the pain we feel. I will develop the fungierende intentionality as one of the operative concepts of phenomenology and as an existential feature of intersubjective and practical life that allows us to transcend naturalistic and cognitivist explanations of pain. The intentional arc will give us the key to the body schema in which we discover the true consciousness of pain, which is not consciousness of the object, and which will allow us to understand even the phenomenon of pain in a missing limb. I will question the widespread solipsistic conviction of pain by emphasizing its intersubjectivity. I will conclude by raising the need to complement the perspective of current medicine with phenomenological studies to understand the experience of that multidimensional process that is pain.