{"id":5714,"date":"2022-07-27T09:50:28","date_gmt":"2022-07-27T07:50:28","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/?p=5714"},"modified":"2022-07-27T09:50:28","modified_gmt":"2022-07-27T07:50:28","slug":"discipline-filosofiche-xxxi-2-2021-lintuizione-e-le-sue-forme-prospettive-e-problemi-dellintuizionismo-a-cura-di-stefano-besoli-e-luca-guidetti","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/ultimi-numeri\/discipline-filosofiche-xxxi-2-2021-lintuizione-e-le-sue-forme-prospettive-e-problemi-dellintuizionismo-a-cura-di-stefano-besoli-e-luca-guidetti\/","title":{"rendered":"Discipline Filosofiche XXXI, 2, 2021: Intuition and its Forms. The Prospects and Problems of Intuitionism, edited by Stefano Besoli and Luca Guidetti"},"content":{"rendered":"<span style=\"color: #006400; font-size: medium;\"><strong>XXXI, 2, 2021: Intuition and its Forms. The Prospects and Problems of Intuitionism. Edited by Stefano Besoli and Luca Guidetti<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.torrossa.com\/en\/resources\/an\/5280390\"><span style=\"font-size: 16px; color: #ff0000;\">Buy the electronic version<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/06\/01-cop-discipline-2-2021_cropped-1.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-4004 alignleft\" src=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/06\/01-cop-discipline-2-2021_cropped-1.jpg\" alt=\"copertina-2016-1-fronte\" width=\"280\" height=\"418\" \/><\/a>Since ancient times, the concept of intuition (<em>epibol\u00e9<\/em>, <em>intuitus<\/em>) has denoted a direct and immediate relation with any object whatsoever, a relation involving the object\u2019s actual presence. This definition, which applies to intuition in all its versions, is so wide as to include apparently antithetical views, depending on how the relation\u2019s <em>immediateness <\/em>and the object\u2019s <em>presence <\/em>are understood. For if it is a relation, then, even if it doesn\u2019t feature any intermediaries, its <em>relata <\/em>must be distinct, which is the claim of all the views that emphasize the object\u2019s presence to a consciousness, a faculty or, more generally, a property and a way of being of a subject. However, conceiving intuition as an object\u2019s <em>position <\/em>before a conscience, in the visual way typical in the first instance of classical Geek philosophy, yields the paradox that a relation is intuitive insofar as it removes, at least in part, the distinction between subject and object and so ceases to be a relation, leaving room for various forms of <em>coincidence <\/em>or <em>compenetration <\/em>of the terms, after the fashion of the intuitionistic views of, e.g., Plotinus, Spinoza and Bergson. This depends on the fact that, from an epistemic point of view, an immediate relation that requires the object\u2019s presence is inherently unstable, as it tends to collapse either onto the higher limit of the annihilation of the distincts, which is the typical outcome of idealistic, conscientialist, and even mystical views (according to which intuition is an internal or monadic relation), or onto the lower limit of their discursive multiplication, which is a mark of the realist dilution of objectual presentiality in various forms of comparative objectivation. However, it is clear that such an objectiva-tion involves what is essentially a suppression of the very concept of intuition, leading to its replacement by such bases of triadic or polyadic relations as \u2018A intuits B as C\u2019 (see, in this regard, F. Kambartel, <em>Anschauung<\/em>, in J. Mittelstra\u00df (hrsg. von), <em>Enzyklop\u00e4die Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie<\/em>, Metzler, Stuttgart, 1995, Bd. 1, p. 120).<br \/>\nThe easiest way to solve the difficulties associated with the need to reconcile the relation\u2019s immediateness with the object\u2019s presence would then seem to be precisely to get rid of intuition as an epistemic relation, conceiving it instead, after the fashion of some recent positivist and analytic trends, as a form of direct and extralogical \u2013 that is to say, aesthetic, moral or sentimental \u2013 contact of the subject with the world. However, this does not address the issue of the unity and presence to the mind of complex objects or relational structures, with reference to which (along with \u201csimple\u201d objects) discursive thought unfolds. And apart from that, the most serious flaw of the solution lies in its evading the issue of the \u201cprinciples\u201d, an issue that incessantly re-emerges within any form of comparative reasoning. Aristotle already pointed out that \u00abit is by another method, not by proof, that we acquire knowledge of the first principle\u00bb (<em>Gen. an.<\/em>, Il, 6, 743), \u00abfor while the other propositions are shown through these [the first principles], these cannot be shown through anything else\u00bb (<em>Top.<\/em>, VIII, 3, 158 b 2). This is why knowledge of the principles appears \u00abhigher than any other \u00bb (<em>An. post.<\/em>, I, 9, 76 a 21): it is an intuitive knowledge of those truths that do not require any proof, \u00abfor to prove anything is impossible unless one begins with the appropriate principles\u00bb (<em>Top.<\/em>, VIII, 3, 158 a 36).<br \/>\nThe immediate possession of the principles does not eliminate, then, the necessity of demarcating them with respect to the acts and structures of \u201cconsciousness\u201d (however conceived). On the other hand, articulating the various moments in which such a demarcation consists requires that a non-mediated unity capable of displaying the <em>sense <\/em>of any discursive articulation be posited as a ground for the mediated processes. The problem of intuition lies wholly within this particular <em>figure of complementarity<\/em>, according to which intuitive knowledge establishes in fact an intimate relation between the knowing subject and the object known, but on the other hand always requires, as it expresses itself, a certain degree of objectivation, and hence of opposition of the object to the subject, which is true even in the case of self-knowledge.<br \/>\nIn other terms, intuition is represented or <em>expressed <\/em>through mediation, which in turn is realized or <em>performed <\/em>through intuition. In any genuine concept of intuition emerging in the period that spans from classical Greek thought to the end of the Nineteenth century, these two aspects, the static and the dynamic, exhibit a continuous dialectical ten-sion; however, an emphasis on the former may obscure or weaken the latter, and vice versa. Thus, for instance, with Kantian sensible intuition, the emergence of the given downplays, in its static receptivity, the dynamic character of sensation, which requires the archetypal or creative intuition of the understanding as its expressible but non-performable complement. A complementary reversal of Kantianism yields the intellectual intuition of the first phase of German classic idealism, especially in Fichte and Schelling. Here intuition presents itself as the principle \u2013 which can be performed but never wholly expressed \u2013 that provides the background for the acts of a nature-oriented consciousness. Such a polarity is still operative in Brouwer\u2019s intuitionism, where the dynamic aspect of the \u201cintuition by construction\u201d turns the \u201cintuition by evidence\u201d typical of classical logic and of the naive concept of number into a merely partial moment, an instant or product of the mind, within the procedures of calculation and generation of mathematical entities. On the other hand, Husserlian phenomenology, addressing the theme of the constitution of experience, gives to \u201cessence vision\u201d a new and in many respects unprecedented task. According to Husserlian phenomenology, it is crucial to overcome the polarity of evidence and constitution, highlighting the originary link between sensible givenness and categorial universality in the acts of fulfilling of the knowledge-intention. In this way, intuition loses the merely <em>functional <\/em>qualification that belongs to the \u201ccriterion\u201d or the \u201chigher faculty\u201d of individuating the principles, as-suming instead the <em>operating <\/em>character of a correlation of consciousness and world that establishes itself from the beginning.<br \/>\nOn the other hand, in Husserl\u2019s view, evidentness, as the \u201cgiving of something in itself\u201d (E. Husserl, <em>Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft<\/em> (1929), in Hua XVII, P. Janssen (hrsg. von), Nijhoff, Den Haag, 1974, p. 167), the manifestation of things in their originary way of being, is neither a criterion nor a fact, for it possesses its own graduality, a \u00abuniversal teleological structure\u00bb that extends to consciousness in so far as intentionality and evidentness \u00abare essentially co-belonging\u00bb concepts (E. Husserl, <em>Formale und transzendentale Logik<\/em>, pp. 168 sq.). <em>Qua <\/em>the \u00abuniversal mode of intentionality\u00bb, evidentness is not the static mark of an epistemic certainty of a psychological kind, leaving aside any question about the sense of the being that lies at its ground. On the contrary, by being at the centre of the issue of intentionality, evidentness is the problematic heading of the whole question of being as it is addressed by phenomenology, for it makes clear, by virtue of being the ostensive character of everything we experience, that the manifestation of any single objectual givenness in a specific domain of sense can never constitute, in principle, its absolute givenness. At this juncture of thought, intuition \u2013 whether in the role of <em>Anschauung <\/em>or <em>Intuition <\/em>(cf. E. Husserl, <em>Ideen zu einer reinen Ph\u00e4nomenologie und ph\u00e4nomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einf\u00fchrung in die reine Ph\u00e4nomenologie<\/em>, in Hua III\/1, K. Schuhmann (hrsg. von), Nijhoff, Den Haag, 1976, \u00a7 24, p. 51), of categorial or essence intuition \u2013 becomes the manifesto of a philosophical reflection that, by virtue of its own distinctive status, does not pretend to break loose from the articulated texture of experience, but rather aims at deriving, in its wake, the nature of the material a priori and of its inherent contingency (cf. E. Husserl, <em>Formale und transzendentale Logik<\/em>, Erg\u00e4nzender Text V (1920-1921), pp. 379 sqq.). As Heidegger himself came to recognise, Husserl\u2019s discovery of categorial intuition made it possible to turn the a priori in a \u00abtitle of being\u00bb (M. Heidegger, <em>Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs<\/em> (SS 1925), GA 20, P. Jaeger (hrsg. von) 1979, p. 101), in so far as a priori knowledge is no longer modelled on discursive reason, but can now be viewed as operating in an intuitive way by grasping essences that can be described as material in that they possess a determinate content, resisting any characterisation in terms of mere empirical typicalities, but also in terms of Kantian categorial forms. According to Husserl\u2019s phenomenology, there is then a necessity that is grounded in the essential particularity of contents: such a necessity cannot translate into a formal a priori expressing analytic conditions of a merely subjective nature, for it must rely on the mereological pattern of the structure of experience. As a consequence, intuitive thought relates to a dialectic that links the abstract and the concrete, requiring a synthesis which does not involve the presence of any absolute givenness or of totally independent contents. This precludes any outcome in which every essential intuition or ideating abstraction can be self-sufficient in non-relational terms, precisely because any such intuition or abstraction is subject to a grounding relation.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Contents<\/strong><br \/>\n<span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">(click on the titles to view the abstracts) <\/span><\/p>\n<p>Stefano Besoli, Luca Guidetti, Premessa<br \/>\nMarwan Rashed, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/Hi\u0161\u0101m-ibn-al-\u1e24akam-et-Sulaym\u0101n-ibn-\u01e6ar\u012br-entre-sto\u00efcisme-et-kal\u0101m.-De-la-n\u00e9gation-du-tiers-exclu-\u00e0-la-distinction-entre-\u00ab-chose-\u00bb-et-\u00ab-existant-\u00bb.pdf\">Hi\u0161\u0101m ibn al-\u1e24akam et Sulaym\u0101n ibn \u01e6ar\u012br entre sto\u00efcisme et kal\u0101m : de la n\u00e9gation du tiers-exclu \u00e0 la distinction entre \u00ab chose \u00bb et \u00ab existant \u00bb<\/a><br \/>\nAldo L\u2019Erario, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/Rethinking-Aristotelian-Intuition-after-the-Downfall-of-the-Intuitionist-Reading.pdf\">Rethinking Aristotelian Intuition after the Downfall of the Intuitionist Reading<\/a><br \/>\nMatthias Ko\u00dfler, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/Von-der-g\u00f6ttlichen-Schau-zur-Erfahrungserkenntnis.-Intuition-im-Hoch-und-Sp\u00e4tmittelalter.pdf\">Von der g\u00f6ttlichen Schau zur Erfahrungserkenntnis: Intuition im Hoch- und Sp\u00e4tmittelalter<\/a><br \/>\nGennaro Luise, Matteo Negro, Antonio Giovanni Pesce, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/L\u2019intuizione-intellettuale-nel-tomismo.pdf\">L\u2019intuizione intellettuale nel tomismo<\/a><br \/>\nRiccardo Chiaradonna, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/La-terza-meditazione-di-Plotino.pdf\">La terza meditazione di Plotino<\/a><br \/>\nFr\u00e9d\u00e9ric de Buzon, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/Le-primat-de-l\u2019intuition-dans-les-d\u00e9buts-de-la-philosophie-moderne.-Structure-et-usage-d\u2019un-acte-de-l\u2019esprit-chez-Descartes.pdf\">Le primat de l\u2019intuition dans les d\u00e9buts de la philosophie moderne. Structure et usage d\u2019un acte de l\u2019esprit chez Descartes<\/a><br \/>\nSimone Guidi, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/Acies-mentis.-Il-progetto-cartesiano-di-un\u2019epistemologia-dell\u2019intuitus-e-il-suo-ripensamento-metafisico.pdf\">Acies mentis. Il progetto cartesiano di un\u2019epistemologia dell\u2019intuitus e il suo ripensamento metafisico<\/a><br \/>\nStefan Klingner, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/Kant-and-the-Rationalist-Myth-of-the-Given.pdf\">Kant and the Rationalist Myth of the Given<\/a><br \/>\nIves Radrizzani, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/Place-et-fonction-de-l\u2019intuition-dans-la-philosophie-ficht\u00e9enne.pdf\">Place et fonction de l\u2019intuition dans la philosophie ficht\u00e9enne<\/a><br \/>\nErik Eschmann, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/\u00c4sthetische-Kontemplation-als-besonnene-Intuition.-Wie-intuitive-Erkenntnis-bei-Schopenhauer-interesselos-sein-kann.pdf\">\u00c4sthetische Kontemplation als besonnene Intuition. Wie intuitive Erkenntnis bei Schopenhauer interesselos sein kann<\/a><br \/>\nRocco Ronchi, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/Che-cosa-\u00e8-reale.-Il-metodo-bergsoniano-della-intuizione-alla-prova-della-relativit\u00e0-einsteiniana.pdf\">Che cosa \u00e8 reale? Il metodo bergsoniano della intuizione alla prova della relativit\u00e0 einsteiniana<\/a><br \/>\nGerhard Heinzmann, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/L\u2019Intuition-\u00e9pist\u00e9mique.pdf\">L\u2019Intuition \u00e9pist\u00e9mique<\/a><br \/>\nFrancesco Allegri, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/W.D.-Ross-e-l\u2019intuizionismo-in-etica.pdf\">W.D. Ross e l\u2019intuizionismo in etica<\/a><br \/>\nErnesto V. Garcia, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/Intuitions-in-21st-Century-Moral-Philosophy.-Why-Ethical-Intuitionism-and-Reflective-Equilibrium-Need-Each-Other.pdf\">Intuitions in 21st-Century Moral Philosophy: Why Ethical Intuitionism and Reflective Equilibrium Need Each Other<\/a><br \/>\nLuca Guidetti, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/Moritz-Schlick-e-il-problema-dell\u2019intuizione-nel-Neopositivismo.pdf\">Moritz Schlick e il problema dell\u2019intuizione nel Neopositivismo<\/a><br \/>\nStefano Besoli, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/10\/Esercitare-lo-sguardo.-Intuizione-categoriale-e-complessit\u00e0-del-vedere-nel-mutare-della-fenomenologia-da-Husserl-a-Heidegger.pdf\">Esercitare lo sguardo: intuizione categoriale e complessit\u00e0 del vedere nel mutare della fenomenologia da Husserl a Heidegger<\/a>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>XXXI, 2, 2021: Intuition and its Forms. The Prospects and Problems of Intuitionism. Edited by Stefano Besoli and Luca Guidetti Buy the electronic version Since ancient times, the concept of intuition (epibol\u00e9, intuitus) has denoted a direct and immediate relation with any object whatsoever, a relation involving the object\u2019s actual presence. This definition, which applies &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5714","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","","category-ultimi-numeri"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5714","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5714"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5714\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5715,"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5714\/revisions\/5715"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5714"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5714"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5714"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}