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<\/a><\/p>\nBuy the electronic version<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n DF XXIII, 2013-2:<\/a><\/strong> THE IMPACT OF LEIBNIZ ON DEVELOPMENTS OF HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY<\/a><\/strong> ed. by Francesco Bianchini and Enrico Pasini<\/strong><\/p>\n On the other hand there is the reprisal of Leibnizian monadology in the Husserlian treatment of intersubjectivity. \u201cI myself am really a monadologist\u201d, Husserl once wrote to Dietrich Mahnke, even though he added that he rather would not liken the monad\u2019s law of development to that of a mathematical series, as Leibniz had done. But this interest of Husserl\u2019s for certain ideas of Leibniz\u2019s did not develop, neither in him nor in his school, into a proper interest for a study of Leibniz\u2019s works and deeds, with the notable exception, precisely, of Mahnke\u2019s early interest for a phenomenological reading of the Leibnizian project of a universal mathematics. In time, so many aspects of their theoretical connections have been explored: from the relation between both philosophies as regards formal sciences, to the influence of Leibniz\u2019s and Husserl\u2019s ideas on contemporary philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and cognitive science; the relation of analysis and synthesis, of a priori<\/em> truths and truths of fact, in their philosophical methods; continuities in the use of symbolism or in the rejection of psychological conceptions of mathematics or truth; the conception of \u201cfirst philosophy\u201d in the respective meanings; the relation between the themes of Husserlian formal ontology and the logical-ontological structure of Leibniz\u2019s thought; up to the efforts to show that Leibniz\u2019s metaphysics has been in truth a phenomenology.<\/p>\n The same richness is apparent in studies of late-Husserlian and post-Husserlian developments. Husserl\u2019s and Heidegger\u2019s attitude towards Leibniz and their readings of him; G\u00f6del\u2019s move from a Leibnizian frame to seeking in Husserl something that would set in motion the axiomatic machine; Nishida\u2019s phenomenology of self and its relation to monadology; these and other themes have been studied with both theoretical and historical approaches. Important contributions as the collection edited by Cristin and Sakai have referred to the views of phenomenologically connotated authors, or to the presence in Leibniz\u2019s writings of concepts that are typical of the phenomenological perspective.<\/p>\n And nevertheless, quite contrarily to this last attitude, phenomenological view of Leibniz\u2019s thought may even have helped in the past to avoid or contrast a reading of Leibniz\u2019s thought as sheer idealistic phenomenalism. Leibniz rather establishes the category of well-founded phenomena, with the realm of which, albeit not in full independence from metaphysics, natural philosophy, or physical science, concerns itself. In this sense, real<\/em> phenomena are the world. In recent times Vincenzo De Risi has indeed pointed out a \u201cphenomenological turn\u201d in Leibniz\u2019s late philosophy, when he arrived \u201cto define (and not just characterize) quality and quantity through a co-perceptual act\u201d.<\/p>\n In the following pages, the authors have not only tried to keep faith to this picture of continuities and analogies, but to shed light, as well, both on the complexities that a too much optimistic view has sometimes evaded, and on aspects that in that picture were not eminent enough. On the one hand, phenomenological analysis of the transcendental subject as person brings to quite different results, since the Identita<\/em>\u0308<\/em>t des Ichs<\/em> \u201cis not substantial identity\u201d. That is to say: Leibniz\u2019s metaphysics is absent, there are neither substantial pre-established harmony nor creator, and Husserl\u2019s monads clearly have windows; they are part, not of a republic of spirits, but of the human community. On the other hand, in a sense, Leibniz is innocent of the crisis of natural sciences: life, meaning, even teleology permeate his universe, although he is less eurocentric than Husserl in his views on world history. These and other connections have been raised by the authors of this issue. But Leibniz\u2019s philosophy is a many-sided system of thought, and the analysis of its relationships with later philosophers is able to bring about new interpretations. Husserl, and phenomenological thought in general, have been for us and, we hope, will be again for others a philosophical buttress strong enough to bring to light new perspectives on Leibniz\u2019s account of the world, of science, and of humanity.<\/p>\n Contents<\/strong> Francesco Bianchini, Enrico Pasini,<\/span>\u00a0Introduction<\/em><\/a><\/span><\/span> \u00a0<\/em><\/strong><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" DF XXIII, 2013-2: THE IMPACT OF LEIBNIZ ON DEVELOPMENTS OF HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY ed. by Francesco Bianchini and Enrico Pasini \u201cThus phenomenology leads to the monadology anticipated by Leibniz in ingenious aper\u00e7u\u201d; with these words, Husserl concluded his lecture about \u201cFirst Philosophy\u201d in the year 1924. Anticipation is a construct now barred from the history of …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2942","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ultimi-numeri"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2942","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2942"}],"version-history":[{"count":28,"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2942\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6421,"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2942\/revisions\/6421"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2942"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2942"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2942"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"L\u2019incidenza](\"http:\/\/www.disciplinefilosofiche.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/df-incidenza-leibniz.jpg\" "\\"L\u2019incidenza")
\u201cThus phenomenology leads to the monadology anticipated by Leibniz in ingenious aper\u00e7u\u201d; with these words, Husserl concluded his lecture about \u201cFirst Philosophy\u201d in the year 1924. Anticipation is a construct now barred from the history of philosophy, but it is impossible to deny all value to such first-hand allegations. Aim of this issue is to signalize the connections, or the very continuities, between certain elements of Leibniz\u2019s philosophy and of Husserl\u2019s phenomenology in its different stages of development. Starting from the aspects of Husserlian thought that in the eye of the scholar, or of Husserl himself, seem to be present in Leibniz\u2019s thought, we shall analyse in some deepness the relation between these two different lines of theoretical and philosophical reflection. On the one hand, Leibniz and Husserl can be considered as the most significant stages of a philosophical view according to which thought is the lieu of abstract, ideal, and symbolic forms, that are not so distant, yet, nor separated from a reality entirely tangible. From this point of view, we can easily remark how strictly related Leibniz\u2019s idea of mathesis universalis<\/em>, and Husserl\u2019s radicalization of pure logic as a theory of science \u2013 better, as a theory of every possible forms of theory \u2013 really are.<\/p>\n
\n(click on the titles to download the abstracts)<\/span><\/p>\n
\nGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Omnia in infinitum postremo resolvuntur<\/a><\/span><\/em> (ed. by Enrico Pasini)
\n<\/em><\/span>Enrico Pasini,\u00a0Teleologia in Leibniz e Husserl. Brevi note a partire da un inedito leibniziano<\/a><\/em><\/span><\/span>
\nKlaus Erich Kaehler,\u00a0 ‘Erste Philosophie’ bei Leibniz und Husserl: N\u00e4he und grundlegende Differenz<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/em><\/span>Laurent Perreau,\u00a0 Ph\u00e9nom\u00e9nologie et m\u00e9taphysique : Les usages de Leibniz dans la philosophie husserlienne<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/em><\/span>Burt C. Hopkins, Leibniz and Husserl on universal science<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/em><\/span>Edoardo Caracciolo, Husserl e l’<\/a><\/em>analysis situs<\/a> leibniziana<\/a><\/em><\/span><\/span>
\nVincent G\u00e9rard,\u00a0Loi et n\u00e9cessit\u00e9. Sur la distinction leibnizienne des v\u00e9rit\u00e9s de fait et des v\u00e9rit\u00e9s de raison chez Husserl<\/a><\/em><\/span><\/span>
\nAndrea Altobrando,\u00a0La variazione husserliana del concetto di monade<\/a><\/em><\/span><\/span>
\nMichael K. Shim,\u00a0Monad and consciousness in Husserl. A quasi-representationalist interpretation<\/a><\/em><\/span><\/span>
\nFrancesco Bianchini,<\/span> L’approccio fenomenologico alla scienza cognitiva. Le forme della conoscenza tra Leibniz e Husserl<\/a><\/span><\/em>
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