Michael K. Shim  
*Monad and Consciousness in Husserl. A Quasi-representationalist Interpretation*

Department of Philosophy  
California State University, Los Angeles  
USA  
e-mail: mshim@calstatela.edu

In this paper, I show that by “Monad” the later Husserl means roughly what he meant by “das reine Bewußtsein” in the period of *Ideas* I. Of both consciousness and Monad, Husserl claims that objects of perception are immanent to them. I describe this claim as “quasi-representationalist” just because it bears enough similarity to some versions of contemporary representationalism. Since Husserl also claims that perceptual objects are publicly accessible, the inevitable conclusion seems to be that parts of perceptual consciousness must also be publicly accessible. So strong internalist, Cartesian or idealist, interpretations of Husserl must be wrong. By the same token, if perceptual objects are necessarily physical, it then seems Husserl must agree that the physical can be, in some sense, immanent to consciousness.