Andrea Altobrando  
*La variazione husserliana del concetto di monade*

Hokkaido University (JSPS-Fellow)  
Japan  
e-mail: andalt@gmail.com

In this article I investigate the meaning of the Husserlian notion of monad and I argue for its phenomenological legitimacy. I assert that it is a consistent development of the phenomenological understanding of the Cartesian *cogito* and that it is particularly appropriate to a phenomenological epistemology. The convergences and divergences between Husserl’s and Leibniz’s theories of the monad are also discussed with respect to specific aspects. I conclude by showing what can be considered to be the main difference between the two monadologies. Contrary to what interpreters have generally claimed a dissimilarity shall not be traced back to Husserl’s occasional remark that monads “have windows”. Rather, following Husserl’s reworking of the notion of monad we should acknowledge an irreducibility between monad and world and that monad presents itself as *per essentiam* undetermined.