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*Bolzano e Kant*

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The paper analyses the way in which Bolzano relates to Kant's thought, and in particular to *Critique of pure reason*, as from the period of Bolzano's philosophical formation and his early writings. The Bolzanian criticism toward transcendental subjectivism reveals itself, in its extreme peculiarity, through the development of a logical objectivism, ascribing to purely logical objects – representations, propositions and truths – a character in themselves, nevertheless avoiding that it becomes a form of Platonism or of a transcendental precritical realism. Bolzano's dealing with Kant begins, in *Beyträge* (1810), with a careful examination of Kantian mathematical conception, of which he stresses the intuitionistic and constructivistic aspect, underlying the problematic genesis of synthetic a priori judgment. The paper underlines the main aspects of Bolzanian criticism toward notion of pure intuition and toward its innermost inconsistency, showing how a deep reformulation of transcendental aesthetics originates from the rejection of transcendental schematism, of transcendental logic and of conception of space and time as «pure a priori intuitions». In such a reformulation – in the framework of a transformation of the a priori in a conceptual sense – the so-called «secondary qualities» as well are worth considering as «a priori forms». Finally, the paper examines the evolution of criticism that Bolzano addresses to Kantian distinction between analytical and synthetic judgments. The last act of such a criticism takes place in *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837), in which Bolzano gets ready from a semantic point of view – by means of the method of variation and the procedure of substitution – a notion of analyticity, that allows to outline the objective properties of analytical propositions and, at the same time, the existence of a purely conceptual synthetic a priori.