Rosa Maria Calcaterra

*Clarence Irving Lewis' pragmatic a priori*

Kantian theory of *a priori* knowledge had a pivotal role in the development of XIXth and XXth centuries’ epistemological debate, and various approaches both akin to and in contrast with Kant’s formulation have been effective also on the level of practical philosophy. In this paper I offer a reconstruction of Clarence Irving Lewis’ pragmatical notion of the *a priori*, finding that his starting point for developing this notion are his works on logic and, particularly, his emphasis on the intensional logical relation, which I also analyze in the light of Lewis’ theory of language. My suggestion is that a systematic comparison between his pragmatical approach to the transcendental aspect of knowledge and the positions developed on the matter within logical empiricism would be worth the effort, both from an historical and a theoretical point of view, and would enable a better understanding of the contemporary «relativization» of the *a priori*.