

David Espinet
Lernen von der Kunst
Exemplarische Autonomie und praktische Einbildungskraft bei Kant

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In this paper, I argue that Kant's doctrine of free succession in the context of exemplary art also has explanatory potential for his understanding of exemplary autonomy, as found, for example, in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals III* or the methodology of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Based on this, I argue for the existence of practical imagination as well as of a genuinely practical transcendental schema of exemplarity as the condition of possibility for the constitution of individual forms of exemplarity. To this aim, I discuss three readings of Kant's practical philosophy: Seyla Benhabib's and Mark Coeckelbergh's on the role of imagination in the framework of moral reasoning, and Inga Römer's on the idea of freedom as *causa exemplaris*. Taking one step beyond the aforementioned positions, I propose to conceive of practical imagination primarily as a faculty of *Vor-bild*, that is to say of practical identity in general. Thus understood, practical identity mediates between the autonomous singularity that each of us is and identity in terms of autonomous existence.