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*Le primat de l'intuition dans les débuts de la philosophie moderne. Structure et usage d'un acte de l'esprit chez Descartes*

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The aim of this paper is to clarify the concept of *intuitus* that Descartes uses in the *Regulæ ad directionem ingenii*, by showing how intuitive evidence is different from the medieval conception of simple apprehension and from certain common representations of intuition in scientific discovery. We examine the relationship between *intuitus* and *deductio*, as well as the intuitive character of the deduction itself. The Cartesian intuition is intellectual but can be aided by imagination and sensation; it bears above all on utterances, presupposing an innate knowledge by the mind of the components of these utterances. This is illustrated by some aspects of Cartesian epistemology and by the example of the *cogito*.