This paper seeks in the first place to distinguish the category of the example from the category of the exemplar. To this aim, two distinct ways of representing and applying a rule are contrastively outlined and the respective ‘temporal properties’ of the example and the exemplar are spelled out. While a more reductive structure is seen at play in the example, caught in between the ‘present’ of the representation, the ‘past’ of the reference to a pre-existing norm/concept, and the ‘future’ of predictable cases, a more extensive temporal dynamic is seen as a defining trait of the exemplar, insofar it embodies its own rule and establishes the validity of the particular well beyond the particular. Furthermore, the “exemplary necessity” of the judgment of taste, theorized by Kant in the third Critique, provides the opportunity to explore the variously understood notion of ‘givenness’ and the emerging property of future-directedness. The predictive aspect of the instance (example) and the prospective aspect of the exemplar are therefore tested against the background of the future-directedness of cognitive and non-cognitive judgments. Finally, the article discusses Hannah Arendt’s reading of Kant’s reflective judgment and the ensuing political relevance of the given pragmata and of non-cognitive judgments in their public use and temporal configuration. Arendt’s contribution helps pinpointing the true sense of the temporal traits of the exemplar as creative and based on praxis.