Among the recent studies on the notion of exemplarity, Alessandro Ferrara’s work stands out as proposing fruitful analyses of how to integrate structures pertaining to aesthetic judgement within the field of morality. The concept of exemplarity is particularly important for morality insofar as it allows to mediate between universalism and pluralism. This is notably due, on the one hand, to the flexibility and adaptability of examples to different situations, since they do not give an analytical and rigid statement of their own meaning, and, on the other hand, to the psychological resonance of examples as guiding and orienting actions. This paper argues that Ferrara’s insight can be reassessed if we consider the grasping of exemplarity as based on a particular way of conceiving induction, namely as a non-monotonic inference. In order to explain the structure of this inference, the paper also relies on the works of Jean Piaget, Nelson Goodman, Gregory Bateson and Rudolf Arnheim.