The present paper deals with the diachronic evolution of the Cartesian concept of *intuitus*, focusing particularly on the reasons for its (at least lexical) dismissal in Descartes’s mature elaborations of his metaphysics. In section 1, I address the notion of *intuitus* presented in the *Rules*, showing that this concept is pivotal in Descartes’ early epistemology of evidence. In section 2, I argue that such a concept can be traced back to certain distinctive elements of the Late Scholastic debate on angels and human knowledge, from which Descartes could have drawn some of his early ideas. In section 3, I analyze the reasons behind Descartes’ dismissal of the notion of *intuitus*, arguing for a deliberate choice, due both to epistemologico-metaphysical and theological reasons, on which I dwell focusing especially on Descartes’ letters.