In this paper I draw attention to a little-known confrontation between Sidney Hook and Dorion Cairns that unfolded on the pages of *The Journal of Philosophy* in 1930. Hook published “A Personal Impression of Contemporary German Philosophy” following a brief stint studying in Germany. Hook initially identifies the phenomenological movement as one of the few high points of early 20th century German philosophy. However, Cairns found fault with almost every characterization that Hook gave of Husserl’s phenomenology. My aim here is to discuss the claims about the aims and method of phenomenology we find in Hook’s original appraisal and that get amplified and developed into criticisms of Husserl in his subsequent reviews of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and *Ideas I*. Unfortunately, many of these criticisms, which Cairns considered to be based on misconceptions and misunderstandings, persist among Anglo-American philosophers today. Despite Cairns’ attempt to defend Husserl, Hook maintained that Cairns did not adequately address the argument that Husserl’s logical realism and transcendental idealism are incompatible. Moreover, Hook argues that Husserl’s idealism leads to solipsism.